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is limited as it does not account for the circumstances under which access to sensitive data is
requested. Following a qualitative study that elicited access scenarios, we used Object-Process Meth-
odology to structure the scenarios and conceive a Situation-Based Access Control (SitBAC) model. Sit-
BAC is a conceptual model, which deﬁnes scenarios where patient’s data access is permitted or
denied. The main concept underlying this model is the Situation Schema, which is a pattern consisting
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with their properties and relations. The various data access scenarios are expressed via Situation
Instances. While we focus on the medical domain, the model is generic and can be adapted to other
domains.
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During the last two decades, we have been witnessing a grad-
ual transfer from paper-based to electronic-based organization of
information. At the same time, many organizations have become
connected via the Internet, making information in general and
data concerning people’s private lives in particular accessible to
unauthorized vulnerable access. Personal details can be (and of-
ten are) collected, recorded, stored, processed, and transferred to
unknown third parties. This reality is in conﬂict with the funda-
mental human right to control one’s own personal information.
The gap between the ease of access to one’s personal details
and the human desire to control this access is the root cause
of the privacy management and assurance problem.
What is privacy? Jones [1] has deﬁned privacy as ‘‘. . . not having
things known about you that you don’t choose to have known, or at
least you know that they are known and by whom.” Following
Jones’ perception, privacy can be interpreted as a human desire
to keep certain personal details conﬁdential. Indeed, people usually
choose not to disclose their personal details unless they have to, in
particular when it comes to their ﬁnancial and health conditions.
This view is based on ﬁndings of a survey conducted in Australiall rights reserved.
iness Administration, Ruppin
2 9 8987604.[2], where the respondents were asked to rank the types of per-
sonal data, which they prefer not to reveal. Financial and health
information were at the top of the list.
Privacy is often considered a social construct [3,4], which is
more than just an individual’s desire to control access to his or
her personal information. The privacy preservation problem has a
major effect on human communities, as it touches upon social, cul-
tural, economic, and political aspects. Privacy is inﬂuenced by leg-
islation and legal changes, such as the right of free speech [3] and
the right of governments to prosecute criminal activities [5],
changes in technology, changes in journalistic practices [3], and
private sector initiatives, such as WebTrust and other privacy-seal
programs [4].
In many Western countries, the privacy issue has been consid-
ered intensively from the legal aspect. The most important legisla-
tion concerning healthcare privacy preservation is the US Privacy
Rule [6], which resulted primarily from the requirements of the
1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
[7]. The goal of the US Privacy Rule is to ensure that individuals’
health information is properly protected while allowing the ﬂow
of health information needed to provide high-quality health care
to the individual. However, in addition to the goal of providing
the patient with the best medical care, there are other important
goals, such as ﬁnancial reimbursement and public-health require-
ments. For example, in public-health surveillance [8], when an out-
break is detected and anonymized data is used to trace its roots,
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investigation.
In the case of privacy of medical data, patients are not the only
stakeholders. Some stakeholders are interested in medical data for
their own beneﬁts. Quoting Welch, an M.D. from Massachusetts
General Hospital in Boston [9], ‘‘Insurers use identiﬁable medical
records for risk rating, employers use them for hiring and ﬁring,
health systems for quality assurance, pharmaceutical ﬁrms for
marketing, banks for assessing loan risk, and the government for
the detection of fraud.” Other stakeholders who are interested in
patient data for the beneﬁt of the patient or the society include
(1) hospital personnel and primary care physicians, (2) family
members, (3) expert physicians, laboratory workers, health institu-
tions, and pharmacies, (4) dietitians and alternative-medicine ser-
vice providers, (5) insurance companies, (6) scientists, researchers,
and public-health agencies, and (7) community agents, including
ﬁre services, police, ambulance services, and restaurants specializ-
ing in preparation of food for sick people according to their physi-
cian’s orders, such as ‘‘Meals on Wheels.”
In recognition of these views and following previous research
works, our focus has been to develop an approach and a method
for maintaining privacy within the healthcare domain in a way that
would strike a balance between the needs for preserving patient
privacy on one hand and quality of the patient’s medical care on
the other hand.
The literature referring to the privacy problem can be roughly
divided into three categories:
(1) privacy preservation via identity protection, e.g., ﬁngerprint
recognition system [10],
(2) privacy preservation via anonymity, e.g., anonymizing pri-
vate data that include explicit identiﬁers [11], and
(3) privacy preservation via restricting access to data, e.g., access
control and authorization models.
The model we suggest belongs to the third category. We wish to
achieve privacy preservation by means of access control. To this
end, we are interested in identifying scenarios of access requests.
A scenario is a speciﬁc process description of a data access request
to patients’ data. We express scenarios in a semi-formal, computer-
interpretable way. This enables preservation of the patient’s pri-
vacy by exposing only that personal data which is indeed required
for providing the patient with the best medical care in any given
particular scenario.
Signiﬁcant parts of related works with a goal similar to ours fo-
cus on Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [12,13] mechanisms. RBAC
is an approach that separates users and their permissions regard-
ing a collection of resources and places the role of the data-reques-
tor at the center. Our approach is different than that of RBAC
because it is situation-based rather than role-based. Our approach
takes into account that the decision to uncover patients’ health
data is affected by various factors that comprise the situation of
a patient’s data access. Indeed, one of these factors is the role of
the entity that requests the data, but it is deﬁnitely not the only
one. Since there are additional situation factors, we call our access
control approach Situation-Based Access Control, or SitBAC for short.
Unlike RBAC, SitBAC includes abstractions for modeling the entities
involved in a situation—Patient, Data-Requestor, Task, Legal-
Authorization, EHR, and Response—along with their attributes
and the relations among them. We argue that using the health-
care-related abstractions of SitBAC with focus on situations, rather
than using the RBAC approach with focus on roles, will result in
better coverage of the various privacy issues that healthcare orga-
nizations are expected to handle. Hence, SitBAC is likely to also im-
prove the performance of organization privacy ofﬁcers.Our access control model is designed to enable implementation
of the organization’s policies. As a result of modeling data access
scenarios, we have obtained detailed speciﬁcations of various data
access situations. These precisemodels can serve as a basis for orga-
nizations to apply their internal policies and regulations regarding
which action should be carried out by whom. For example, the de-
tails of a patient can be shown to a specialist who needs to treat her
only if there is a referral of the patient to that specialist and if the
specialist is accessing the information fromhis usual working place.
By modeling scenarios such as this we ensure the maintenance of
the patient’s privacy while abiding by the organization’s regula-
tions and enabling high-quality care provision.
Throughout the research, we used two research methods: (1)
qualitative methods to elicit the required data and (2) conceptual
modeling to structure and specify the scenarios. Our long-term
goal is to formalize the conceptual SitBAC model as a situation
knowledge base, such that each new access request, represented
as a situation instance, will be compared against the situation
knowledge base to determine whether the request can be granted
or has to be denied.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 covers
background material, Section 3 presents the research questions,
Section 4 describes the methods we used to carry out the research,
Section 5 presents the results of the research, and Section 6 dis-
cusses them and the signiﬁcance of our approach. Section 7 con-
cludes with a discussion on the applicability of the research.
2. Background
Our research is motivated by preservation of privacy while
accessing Electronic Health Records (EHRs). Accordingly, the re-
view in this section covers the following issues: (1) reasons for pri-
vacy jeopardy or loss, (2) EHR systems, (3) the Role-Based Access
Control model, and (4) access control approaches and work related
to achieving privacy preservation by means of such methods.
2.1. Reasons for privacy jeopardy or loss
Jones [1] has claimed that modern technology constitutes the
main reason for privacy loss and reports the following technologi-
cal characteristics that exacerbate the privacy problem.
(1) Permanence and volume: Transient data (like images) about
events is increasingly captured, recorded, and kept in digital
form. This immense volume of data includes not just pri-
mary data, but also secondary or associated data and meta-
data of all kinds, which may be very extensive.
(2) Invisibility, accessibility, and remoteness: Data about individu-
als, mostly in the public domain, is being constantly col-
lected without getting the individuals’ approval ﬁrst or
bringing the collection to their attention. Once collected, this
data can be read by any number of people, few or many,
authorized or unauthorized, conceptually near or afar.
(3) Assembly and aggregation: It is possible to collect data about
a person from any number of sources and combine them in
ways that provide additional private information.
Due to the growing use of search engines on the Web and with-
in organizations, these characteristics are more prominent today
than in the past.
2.2. Electronic Health Records
In the healthcare domain, digital data about a patient that is col-
lected into a record is often referred to as the Electronic Health Re-
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tient Record (CPR). EHRs record such data items as diagnoses, hos-
pital admissions, medications, operations, laboratory tests,
imaging, and pathology data. Shabo [14] has made the distinction
between health records and medical records by noting that the for-
mer are more general; they are longitudinal and cross-institu-
tional, and may include individual health data such as lifestyle,
workplace hazards, and preferences, which was not necessarily
created during medical practice.
Since the EHR concept appears to be very complex, an endeavor
of Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) has been to an-
chor the EHR to a standard. Two prominent SDOs in the healthcare
domain are Health Level 7 (HL7) [15] and the European Committee
for Standardization (CEN) [16]. Both have focused on creating a
standard for exchanging health data, which might potentially be
the basis for a future standard EHR.
The motivation for producing a protocol for health data ex-
change prior to a standard for EHR structure and content draws
on two main insights: (1) generating one record that will hold
any type of health-related data item for the entire lifetime of a per-
son appears to be a very ambitious goal, (2) various EHR systems
exist within healthcare organizations, and the immediate necessity
is to enable interoperability, i.e., inter-organizational data ex-
change and sharing in order to increase the quality of service to pa-
tients. Simple examples include prevention of repeating orders of
blood tests and reuse of historical data.
Data exchange standards, such as DICOM (Digital Imaging and
Communications in Medicine) [17] and HL7 version 2 messaging
standard [15], are already operational and widely implemented.
DICOM is a standard for handling, storing, printing, and transmit-
ting information in medical imaging, which has been developed
and sponsored by the American College of Radiology and the Na-
tional Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA). The HL7 ver-
sion 2 messaging standard aims to support data interchange and
hospital workﬂows. Originally created in 1987, it deﬁnes a series
of electronic messages to support administrative, logistical, ﬁnan-
cial, and clinical processes.
More recently, HL7 has developed the Clinical Document Archi-
tecture (CDA), which is a speciﬁcation for a medical record mes-
sage that can serve as an infrastructure for exchanging medical
data, such as progress notes, discharge summaries, and results of
physical examinations. CEN has published the pre-standard prENV
13606 by TC.251 for electronic health record communication,
which includes four parts: (1) extended architecture, (2) domain
term list, (3) distribution rules, and (4) messages for the exchange
of information.
2.3. The RBAC model for restricting access to personal data
Privacy via access control and authorization refers to tailored
access control tools, access–control languages, or access control
models that address the provision of infrastructure for developing
access–control and authorization mechanisms. One of the more
recognized access control models, the Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) model, was proposed in 1996 by Sandhu et al. [12,13],
who adopted the ‘‘need-to-know” concept and integrated it into
their model. The concept assumes that privacy is preserved as long
as data access processes occur only when they are necessary for a
right purpose, andminimum details are revealed along the process.
Several access control languages were developed on top of this
model. Since RBAC is one of the leading models in the access-con-
trol/authorization domain, the following paragraphs elaborate on
this model, in particular since we evaluate our SitBAC approach
by comparing it to the RBAC model.
The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [12,13] approach advo-
cates distinguishing different user types and their privilegesregarding a collection of resources. Instead of dealing with the
privileges (permissions) of each user speciﬁcally, the users are
grouped into roles, and each such group is associated with a num-
ber of privileges. Roles can be created and added as much as the
system requires. Each function deﬁned in the system (read, write,
append, delete, create, etc.) can be associated with a privilege that
is assigned to a role. Users are assigned roles based on their
responsibilities and qualiﬁcations. Any user can be reassigned from
a role and assigned to another. Roles are dynamic, so once they are
created with a set of permissions, this set can be changed dynam-
ically without additional compilation. New permissions can be
added to the role and existing permissions can be deleted from it.
The core RBAC includes ﬁve basic elements: Users, Roles, Ob-
jects, Operations, and Permissions. RBAC is organized into four lev-
els of increasing functional capabilities: (1) Flat RBAC, shown in
Fig. 1, supports multiple users per role, multiple roles per user,
multiple permissions (privileges) per role, and multiple roles per
permission, (2) Hierarchical RBAC, which supports role hierarchies
and inheritance, (3) Constrained RBAC, which enforces Separation
of Duty (SOD), and (4) Symmetric RBAC, in which a requirement
for permission-role review is added.
The RBAC approach is widely employed in the healthcare do-
main, probably because the classical healthcare roles (physician,
nurse, secretary, etc.) are straightforward. The following subsec-
tion describes several works that aim to protect health-related
data by means of access control with emphasis on role
deﬁnitions.
2.4. Access-control-based works for protecting healthcare-related data
The majority of the works related to protecting healthcare
data place the role of the data-requestor in the focus of the re-
quest for patient data access. However, as the evaluations below
show, the results are not quite satisfactory. The ﬁrst works rec-
ognized the need of roles [18] and emphasized that role-deﬁning
processes in an EHR system are crucial for privilege manage-
ment. Next, structured roles [19] were characterized, offering
solutions that follow the rationale of allowing access only to
authorized entities, in accord with a table of authorizations
supervised by a security committee. Later on, researchers real-
ized that roles have a dynamic aspect in addition to their struc-
tural aspect [20]. Consequently, existing authorization concepts
had to be extended in order to support particular healthcare
authorization requirements. For instance, a physician is allowed
to access health information about a shared patient only in case
s/he is involved in the treatment of that patient. Finally, an
observation was made that roles have more than one contextual
variable (e.g., time, place, afﬁliation), which affect their behavior.
Motta and Furuie [21] proposed a contextual role-based access
control authorization model aiming to increase patient privacy
and the conﬁdentiality of patient data while being ﬂexible en-
ough to consider speciﬁc cases. They suggested deﬁning a role
hierarchy with inheritance of authorizations and modeling the
types of data found in an EHR according to clinical content
(e.g., demographics, prescriptions). Authorizations are deﬁned
as a 5-tuple with the following elements.
 R, the role;
 PT, the privilege type, which can be positive when an operation
is allowed or negative when it is disallowed;
 Opr, the operation (or access mode);
 Obj, the object (or resource) to be protected; and
 At, the authorization type, which can be strong or weak.
The authors also proposed a technique for handling conﬂicts be-
tween authorizations.
Fig. 1. Elements and their relations in the Flat RBAC.
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While we recognize privacy as a social construct that includes
requirements from the patients, care providers, the payers,
researchers, and public-health authorities, our focus in this re-
search is on the patient. The goal of our research is to develop
and evaluate a request–response decision mechanism for approv-
ing or denying access to requested data in a patient’s electronic
health record, which would meet the expectations of the patient
regarding the protection of her privacy and the requirements of
other stakeholders involved in patient care, including healthcare
providers and administrators, such as medical secretaries. This is
a non-trivial goal due to the complexity of the healthcare domain.
Speciﬁcally, the following aspects make this goal difﬁcult to attain.
(1) A typical EHR can contain large amounts of health-related
data items of various types, shapes, and forms.
(2) Many health-related agents are interested in the informa-
tion contained within EHRs.
(3) Various factors complicate the task of decision-making,
including the place and time of the access request, the
patient’s consent, age, ethnic origin, and the data-requestor’s
workplace and authorized tasks are involved in the data
access scenarios.
(4) Some access-request tasks require different degrees of ano-
nymity in the data to be released, such as de-identifying
patient information.
Considering the ﬁrst three aspects and inspired by the work of
Motta and Furuie [21], we propose a situation-based approach
for developing a decision mechanism for solving the access control
problem within the realm of healthcare. Our research proceeded as
follows. We started by eliciting, modeling, and analyzing domain-
related information by means of qualitative methods. To this end,
we deﬁned a qualitative research question based on the following
three aspects: the EHR data, the interested agents, and the various
factors that account for the complexity of protecting privacy in
electronic healthcare records. The initial research question was for-
mulated as follows:
How can we characterize and model requests for sensitive patient
data disclosure with respect to (1) the participating entities and
their relations, (2) the context of the request, and (3) the types of
requested data?
The second stage of our research involved the development of a
conceptual model of the healthcare access control domain. The sec-
ond research question was therefore:
How can we specify the structure of the requests for disclosure of
sensitive patients’ data and the behavior of the human roles
involved in a way that reﬂects the use of domain abstractions?4. Methods
To achieve the research goal, we employed two complementary
approaches: qualitative research methods were used to answer the
ﬁrst research question and conceptual modeling for the second
one.4.1. Qualitative research methods
Originally applied in social sciences, qualitative research meth-
ods [22] are gaining recognition as being applicable also in the
healthcare informatics area [23]. The qualitative research methods
we used for eliciting and analyzing data included document stud-
ies of EHRs, questionnaires, and interviews.
The three documents we examined were the actual records of
three patients at a local hospital, which were obtained from a com-
mon EHR system. The records were created when the patients ar-
rived at the emergency room, and they were used and updated
while the patients were hospitalized. When the patients left the
hospital, their records were archived by the EHR system. We exam-
ined the records in order to characterize the types of data items
that are recorded while patients visit the hospital and the circum-
stances at which they are exposed. Interesting ﬁndings were dis-
covered while examining these records. For example, in one case
the patient was asked to provide medical information regarding
his close family members.
The questionnaires (provided in Appendix A), administered to
eight patients, were aimed mainly at identifying EHR data items
deemed by the patients to be sensitive in the context of scenarios
of data access.
Semi-structured interviews (see Appendix B) constituted the
centerpiece of this study. We conducted 24 such interviews, each
lasting between 30 and 45 min. The interviewees were patients
and healthcare workers who needed to access EHR data in order
to carry out their tasks. These workers included doctors, nurses, a
secretary, a health information systems administrator, a dietitian,
and a health insurance attorney. The interviewees were asked to
describe various data access encounters that take place while they
provide service to patients. All the interviews were transcribed.
During qualitative analysis on the transcribed interviews and
the questionnaires, we highlighted informative phrases (e.g., types
of medications, laboratory-test results, and nurse) and grouped
them into categories. For example, medications and laboratory-test
results were categorized as EHR Sections, whereas nurse was cate-
gorized as Role. Additional examples are provided in Tables 1 and 2.
4.2. Object-Process Methodology
During further analysis we identiﬁed unique scenarios of re-
quest for data access. As noted, a scenario is a process description
(in unstructured text) of a patient’s data access. We realized that a
scenario could be structured into a pattern that we named Situa-
tion. Consequently, we refer to this stage as situation-based analysis.
We used a structured analysis method for discovering and specify-
ing the structure of the situation. To this end, we used Object-Pro-
cess Methodology (OPM) [24], a holistic systems modeling and
lifecycle-support approach that integrates the structural, func-
tional, and behavioral aspects of a system in a single, unifying
model. The model is expressed bi-modally in equivalent graphics
and text with built-in reﬁnement–abstraction mechanism. We
have used OPM for conceptualizing and structuring the privacy-re-
lated scenarios.
OPM comprises entities and links. The three entity types are ob-
jects, processes (both referred to as ‘‘things”), and states. Objects
are things that exist and can be stateful (i.e., have states). Processes
Table 2
Qualitative and situation-based analyses of Scenario 2—the medical secretary
No. Qualitative analysis Situation-based analysis Allowed value
Informative Phrase Category Situation schema element Super
element
1 Secretary Role of the data-requestor Role Attribute of the data-
requestor
Reﬁneable Secretary
2 Department of
medicine
Workplace of the data-requestor Workplace attribute of the
data-requestor
Reﬁneable Internal Medicine Unit
3 Hospital Organization which owns the EHR Organization, Ownership EHR
‘s attribute
Reﬁneable NA
4 In Relation between medical organization
units
Reﬁneable-Relation Relation Relation: ownership, workplace. Relation-
type: part-of
5 Transfer Action carried out by the data-requestor Action part-of the task Reﬁneable transfer
6 Discharge-Letter EHR section EHR Section part-of the task Reﬁneable Discharge-Letter
7 Of Relation between the patient and the EHR EHR-to-Patient Relation Relation Relation-type:Record-of
8 Patient Patient Patient Entity NA
9 During the previous
three months
Retroactive access-time Retroactive Access-Time data-
requestor’s attribute
Reﬁneable 3 months
Date of issue of a medical section in EHR Date-Of-Issue EHR Section’s
attribute
Reﬁneable NA
Relation between the date-of-issue and the
retroactive access-time
Reﬁneable-Relation Relation Relation: Date-of-Issue, Retroactive
Access-Time Relation-type: Within
10 The patient was
referred
Legal-Authorization Legal- Authorization Entity
Type of legal-authorization Legal-Authorization Type
legal-author’s attribute
Reﬁneable Referral Letter
The Medical Unit which issued the legal-
authorization
Issued-by Medical Unit legal-
author’s attribute
Reﬁneable NA
Relation between the EHR owner and the
creator of the legal-authorization
Reﬁneable-Relation Relation Relation: Owner-of-EHR, Issued-by
Medical Unit Relation-type: Partof
11 County medical
clinic
The Medical Unit to which the legal-author.
was addressed
Referred-to Medical Unit
legal-author’s attribute
Reﬁneable NA
Relation between the referral unit and the
transferred unit
Reﬁneable-Relation Relation Relation: Action, Legal- Author. (referred-
to) Relation-type: Equal-to
NA, not applicable.
Table 1
Qualitative and situation-based analysis of Scenario 1 - The family physician
No. Qualitative analysis Situation-based analysis Allowed value
Informative Phrase Category Situation schema
element
Super
element
1 My Relation between the patient and the data-
requestor
Data Requestor-to-
Patient Relation
Relation Relation-type: family doctor-
of-patient
2 Patient Patient Patient Entity NA
3 Arrives at Location Location patient’s
attribute
Reﬁneable NA
Relation between the patient’s primary care
clinic and his location
Reﬁneable-Relation Relation Relation: Primary Care-Clinic, Location
Relation-type: Equal-to
4 Primary care clinic Workplace of the data-requestor Workplace data-
requestor’s attribute
Reﬁneable NA
Clinics assigned to the patient Primary-Care-Clinic
patient’s attribute
Reﬁneable NA
5 Document Action executed by the data-requestor Action part-of the task Reﬁneable Document
6 Encounter EHR section EHR Section part-of the
task
Reﬁneable Encounter
7 His Relation between the patient and the EHR EHR-to-Patient Relation Relation Relation-type: Record-of
8 EHR EHR EHR Entity
9 Access only from
the clinic
Location Location data-requestor’s
attribute
Reﬁneable NA
Relation between the workplace and the location
of the data-requestor
Reﬁneable-Relation Relation Relation: workplace, Location Relation-
type: Equal-to
NA, not applicable.
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stateful objects by changing their states. Objects and processes
are of equal importance, as they complement each other in the sin-
gle-model speciﬁcation of the system. An online quick guide to Ob-
ject-Process Methodology symbols and semantics (some of which
are used in the OPM models in this paper) is available at http://
www.technion.ac.il/dizza/QuickGuide.doc. As depicted in the
quick guide, links, which are the OPM elements that connect enti-
ties, are of two types: structural and procedural. OPM objects relatestatically to each other via structural relations, graphically ex-
pressed as structural links. The four fundamental structural rela-
tions are aggregation–participation, generalization–specialization,
exhibition–characterization, and classiﬁcation–instantiation. Ob-
jects can also be structurally related to each other by unidirectional
or bidirectional tagged relations, similar to association links in
UML class diagrams. Structural relations specify relations between
any two objects. Due to the object-process symmetry, they can also
specify relations between any two processes. Conversely, proce-
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specify the dynamics of the system. Procedural links include (1)
transforming links: effect link, consumption link, result link, and
the pair of input-output links, (2) enabling links: agent and instru-
ment links, and (3) control links: event, condition, invocation, and
time exception links.
An OPM model consists of a set of hierarchically organized Ob-
ject-Process Diagrams (OPDs) that alleviate systems’ complexity.
Each OPD is obtained by in-zooming or unfolding of a thing (ob-
ject or process) in its ancestor OPD. One or more new things (ob-
jects and/or processes) can be speciﬁed within a thing in an OPD
that was reﬁned from a higher-level OPD. Copies of an existing
thing can be placed in any diagram, where some or all the details,
such as object states or links to other things, which are unimpor-
tant in the context of the diagram, can be hidden. It is sufﬁcient
for some detail to appear once in some OPD for it to be true for
the system in general even though it is not shown in any other
OPD. OPCAT [25] is a software environment that supports OPM-
based system development and lifecycle management.5. Results
The scenarios that we identiﬁed included the same types of
categories detected in the qualitative analysis. Moreover, there
were categories that appeared in each one of the scenarios and
some that were optional. Some categories appeared only once
per scenario while others appeared several times. Realizing that
a scenario could be structured into lower-level building blocks,
we deﬁned a Situation as a structured representation of a sce-
nario of data access request. Situation is the basis for our pro-
posed access control model, hence the name Situation-Based
Access Control, or SitBAC for short.
From the scenarios that we had identiﬁed and collected, we dis-
covered 129 distinct situations in this situation-based analysis.
Most of the situations, 99 in total, were simple, while the remain-
ing 30 were complex. To demonstrate our approach and present
the results, we describe the process of analyzing two scenarios,
which were extracted from two interviews. Following the scenario
descriptions in Section 5.1, we present in Section 5.2 the categories
identiﬁed in these two scenarios. In Section 5.3 we introduce the
generic SitBAC model. The OPM models of the two scenarios are
provided in Section 5.4.
5.1. The two example scenarios
One of the two scenarios, described ﬁrst, was relatively simple,
while the other was more complex.
5.1.1. Scenario 1—the family physician (the simple scenario)
Our simple scenario is extracted from an interviewwith a family
physician, Dr. S. The scenario concerns an appointment of a patient
with his family doctor, inwhich the patient complains about amed-
ical problem.Dr. S. is obliged to document this encounter in the EHR,
and this is done under the EHR Encounters section. If the medical
complaint is followed by a new diagnosis, Dr. S. generates a new re-
cord under the Diagnosis section in the EHR. Dr. S. may prescribe
some medications to the patient, which will result in a new record
in the EHR under the Medications section. Our scenario relates only
to the encounter documenting task, as described by Dr. S. Following
is an excerpt from the interviewwithDr. S.,whichprovided thebasis
for the simple scenario (the numbers are used later on for analysis
purposes).
‘‘When my1 patient2 arrives3 for an appointment at the primary
care clinic4, I need to document5 this encounter6 in his7 EHR8, which
I can access only from the clinic9.”5.1.2. Scenario 2—the medical secretary (the complex scenario)
The complex scenario is taken from an interesting interview
with Ms. R., a secretary of a hospital department head. Among
her other duties, Ms. R. is responsible for preparing the medical
documents necessary for a follow-up encounter between a pa-
tient, who has recently been hospitalized in the department,
and an expert physician, to whom the patient is referred, and
whose clinic is located at the hospital’s county. Ms. R. generates
the documents and transfers them (by fax or email) to the clinic
prior to the encounter. The documents include a discharge letter
with the patient’s current and past diagnoses, a list of currently
prescribed medications, laboratory and imaging test results, and
results of pathology test, if done. Following is an excerpt from
the interview with Ms. R., which provided the basis for the com-
plex scenario.
‘‘As the secretary1 of the department of medicine2 in4 the hospital3,
I can transfer5 a discharge-letter6 of7 a patient8who was hospitalized
in my department during the previous three months9 to a county
medical clinic11 if the patient was referred10 to one of the physicians
who works in this clinic.”
5.2. Categories identiﬁed by the qualitative analysis
Table 1 presents the outcome of the qualitative analysis and the
situation-based analysis of the simple scenario. The second and
third columns represent the outcome of the qualitative analysis.
Each informative phrase that we found is listed in the second col-
umn, while the third column presents the category of the informa-
tive phrase. The other columns represent the outcome of the
situation-based analysis, which is described in detail in Section
5.3. Table 2 describes the same for the second scenario.
5.3. The SitBAC model
As explained in Section 4, the qualitative analysis resulted in a
list of categories, but it did not capture the structure of a scenario.
Analyzing the scenarios further to deﬁne their structure, we ob-
served the following scenario characteristics:
(1) A scenario is a self-contained unit that exhibits certain func-
tionality and conforms to a repeated pattern.
(2) The functions of an organizationally deﬁned role are not
always carried out by an entity assigned with that role. For
example, a secretary may need to use her boss’s password
in order to prepare a patient’s ﬁle.
(3) Depending on the circumstances, the same task may require
different authorizations. For example, a hospital physician
may access a patient’s previous test results only if the
patient is hospitalized in the physician’s department, other-
wise he is not allowed to do so.
Based on these observations, we decided to structure access
scenarios as patterns revolving around tasks rather than around
roles. Under different circumstances, a task can be executed by
different entities in the organization. We call the generic pattern
Situation Schema and speciﬁc scenarios that conform to it—Situ-
ation Instances, or simply Situations. The situation schema is
analogous to an XML schema and a situation is analogous to
an XML document, which contains values and is validated
against its schema.
5.3.1. Situation schema elements
As presented in Table 1 and Table 2, the output of the qualita-
tive analysis was a collection of informative phrases, grouped into
categories. The categories were the basis for deriving the situation
schema, shown in Fig. 2. The situation schema is a pattern that con-
Fig. 2. The Object-Process Diagram of the situation schema (top-level view).
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one of the following super element types:
(1) Entity: A signiﬁcant object in the data access scenario.
(2) Reﬁneable: An object which reﬁnes another super element,
as explained below.
(3) Relation: A link between two entities or between two
reﬁneables.
The classiﬁcation of each super element follows.
5.3.1.1. Entity. Thereare six typesof entities inourmodel. Theseenti-
ties appear in almost all the scenarios that we have encountered:
(1) Data-Requestor: The (human) entity requesting access to the
patient’s data.
(2) Patient: The (human) entity who is the subject of the
requested data.
(3) EHR: The Electronic Health Record where the patient’s data
is maintained.
(4) Task: The operation on the data that the Data-Requestor
wishes to carry out.
(5) Legal-Authorization: A legal document authorizing the
requested Task.
(6) Response: The data access decision made with respect to the
situation in question.5.3.1.2. Reﬁneable. In OPM, objects, relationships, and processes
(the latter are not used in our Situation model) may be complex
or simple. Complex objects and relationships are reﬁned by other
objects, which we refer to as reﬁneables. A reﬁneable is of one of
the following three types:
(1) Part: The reﬁneable relates to the reﬁnee with an aggrega-
tion–participation relation. For example, the entity EHR is
a reﬁnee that consists of several EHR Sections, so each EHR
Section is a reﬁneable of type part.(2) Attribute: The reﬁneable relates to the reﬁnee with an exhi-
bition–characterization relation. For example, the entity
Patient is a reﬁnee that exhibits the Age attribute, so Age
is a reﬁneable of type attribute.
(3) Specialization: The reﬁneable relates to the reﬁnee with a
generalization–specialization relation. For example, the
entity Organization is a reﬁnee that specializes to Medi-
cal Site, so Medical Site is a reﬁneable of type
specialization.
The reﬁneables are structured hierarchically. A reﬁneable can
be assigned with an allowed value. The allowed values are grouped
into sets, which are assigned to the corresponding reﬁneable.
5.3.1.3. Relation. A relation can exist only either between two enti-
ties or between two reﬁneables. The relation is reﬁned by a relation
type, which indicates the nature of the relation, e.g.,Family-Doc-
tor-of-Patient. The two relation kinds are discussed below.
(1) Entity-to-entity relation: Relations between pairs of the six
entities. Most of the possible pair combinations are mean-
ingless (e.g., the Response entity and the EHR entity cannot
establish a relation). There are two possible entity pairs
between which an entity-to-entity relation exists:
(i) The EHR–Patient entity pair, in which case the relation
type is assigned with record-of.
(ii) The Data-Requestor–Patient entity pair, in which case
the relation type is assigned with Family-Doctor-
of-Patient, Gynecologist-of-Patient, etc.(2) Reﬁneable-to-reﬁneable relation: Relationships between
reﬁneables exist only when the two reﬁneables share a com-
mon ancestor in the reﬁneables’ hierarchical structure. For
example, the patient’s Location reﬁneable can be related
via an Equal-to relation type to a data-requestor’sWorkplace
reﬁneable, since both reﬁneables share a common ancestor:
Fig. 4. Allowed values, assigned to EHR Section.
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values: equal-to, different-from, greater-than,
less-than, and within.
Further details are provided in Section 5.3.4.
5.3.2. Situation schema
A Situation Schema is a generic pattern corresponding to data ac-
cess scenarios. It consists of situation schema elements—entities,
reﬁneables, and relations, and it abides by the following rules:
(1) The task entity and the response entity are mandatory ele-
ments that must be present at each situation schema.
(2) The situation schema explicitly deﬁnes the set of reﬁneables
assigned to each entity and to each relation, so the entities
and the relations that participate in a situation can only be
reﬁned by a subset of its corresponding reﬁneables set.
Fig. 2 is a top-level view of the situation schema. Unfolding the
entities and the relations exposes the reﬁneables associated with
the entity or the relation. Fig. 3 is an example of unfolding of the
data-requestor entity of Fig. 2.
5.3.3. Situation
Each patient’s data access scenario can be modeled as a situa-
tion. Each situation is an instance of Situation Schema. As such, it
includes:
(1) at least the mandatory entities,
(2) for each entity, a subset of its reﬁneables set, and
(3) optional relations between entities and between reﬁneables.
For each reﬁneable participating in the situation, at least one of
the two following requirements must be fulﬁlled:
(1) An allowed value is assigned to the reﬁneable. This value is
taken from the set of allowed values for that reﬁneable in
the situation schema. Fig. 4 illustrates allowed values thatFig. 3. An unfolded view of the data-requestor.can be assigned to the EHR Section reﬁneable, showing that
it can assume one of the following three possible values:
Identification Section, Demographic Section,
and Medical Section.
(2) The reﬁneable participates in a reﬁneable-to-reﬁneable rela-
tion instance with another reﬁneable. The relation complies
with the rule that the two participating reﬁneables must
share a common ancestor in the reﬁneables’ hierarchical
structure.
Based on the above deﬁnitions, we can now refer more precisely
to columns 4–6 in Tables 1 and 2, which represent the outcome of
the situation-based analysis. The fourth column lists the situation
schema element. The ﬁfth column lists the mapping of each situa-
tion schema element to a super element, and the sixth column pro-
vides the related allowed value (if it exists). The OPM model
associated with the ﬁrst scenario is provided in Fig. 5, while the
OPM model for the second one is shown in Fig. 6 and in Fig. 7.
5.3.4. Additional details on situation schema elements
In this section, we provide more details about the entities, their
reﬁneables, possible relations, and other ﬁndings that we con-
cluded from the data that we had collected and analyzed.
Patient has attribute reﬁneables such as Age, Gender, Location
(e.g., home, medical clinic), Workplace, Ethnic Origin, and an Is-a-
Celebrity Boolean attribute, indicating whether the patient is a pub-
licly known ﬁgure.
Data-Requestor has attribute reﬁneables such as Role,Workplace,
Employer, Location, Access-Time, Shift-Type, and the Boolean attri-
bute Is-in-Shift. Location might be different from the data-reques-
tor’s usual workplace reﬁneable in some cases. For example, the
data-requestor who works in the pediatric department at a hospi-
tal might be trying to access a patient’s data while he is located in
the emergency room.
EHR is composed of many EHR Section part-of reﬁneables. In or-
der to demonstrate the SitBAC model principles we adopted a sim-
ple model of an EHR, presented by Motta and Furuie [21]. EHR
Fig. 5. Object-Process Diagram of the family physician situation.
Fig. 6. Object-Process Diagram of the medical secretary situation—the single version.
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we present in this paper. As noted, according to our model, the EHR
Section reﬁneable can assume one of the following allowed values:
Identification Section, Demographic Section, and
Medical Section. The Medical Section allowed value
preserves most of the patient’s sensitive data. Specialized medical
sections that were frequently mentioned in the questionnaires and
in the interviews are Prescription, Diagnosis, Test, and
Encounter.Task is composed of two part-of reﬁneables: an Action and an
EHR Section. Action can be assigned with one of the following al-
lowed values: View (which is the most frequent action), Docu-
ment, Update, and Delete. The Action reﬁneable can be
further reﬁned, for example by the Referred-to-Role or Referred-to
Medical Unit attribute reﬁneables.
Legal-Authorization represents the need for formal legal-autho-
rization, especially when the scenario describes an access request
from an entity not afﬁliated with the organization maintaining
Fig. 7. Object-Process Diagram of the medical secretary situation—the pull version.
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reﬁneables, including Legal-Authorization type, Issued-by Medical
Unit, Referred-to Medical unit, and related-to EHR Section.
Response is reﬁned by one attribute reﬁneable named Response
Type. The responsetypecanbeassignedwithoneof the following three
allowedvalues:Approved,DeniedorUnknown. TheDeniedand
the Approved allowed values are used by the situation’s creator to
indicate whether a request for data access is approved or denied.
Data-Requestor-to-Patient Relation is a type of entity-to-entity
relation. It indicates a long-term relation between the two entities
participating in the relation, where the nature of the relation is ex-
pressed via the relation type. In principle, there might be a short-
term relation between the patient and the data-requestor. How-
ever, based on our qualitative ﬁndings, long-term relations are
usually required to be reﬂected within the situation instances.
Moreover, a long-term relation (e.g., between a patient and her
family doctor) is usually expressed within an organization’s data-
base. Thus, long-term relations are items that can be validated
against the organization’s database. We identiﬁed few long-term
relations, such as a patient’s family doctor, a patient’s gynecologist,
and a patient’s psychologist.
Relation between reﬁneables indicates a sustainable relationship
between two reﬁneables that characterizes the situation. Examples
for such relations include data-requestor’s location equal-to data-
requestor’s workplace, and patient’s insurance equal-to data-reques-
tor’s employer.
5.4. Modeling scenarios as situations via OPM
In this section, we use OPM to model the situations associated
with the family physician scenario and the more complex medical
secretary scenario. Each of the situations is speciﬁed via an OPD. In
order to keep the OPDs simple and clear, the relations in the OPDs
are expressed via links, where the allowed values, which are as-
signed to the relation type, appear above the link. Also, when a
reﬁneable is assigned with an allowed value, the value appears
as a gray-colored object, which is connected to the reﬁneable
through a link.5.4.1. The family physician scenario model
Fig. 5 presents the situation of the simple scenario, document-
ing the encounter between a doctor and her patient. We can ob-
serve that the EHR record participates in a reﬁneable relation
with the patient, where the relation type is assigned with a Re-
cord-of allowed value. The patient has a relation with the
data-requestor typed as Family Doctor-of-Patient. As
the OPD speciﬁes, the data-requestor performs an encounter-doc-
umenting task, in which the EHR Section of the task is assigned
with an allowed value Encounter and the task’s action is as-
signed with an allowed value Document. The fact that the data-
requestor needs to be located in his workplace while executing
the task is expressed via the Location attribute reﬁneable of the
data-requestor, which participates in a reﬁneable relation with
the data-requestor’s Workplace attribute reﬁneable. The relation
type is assigned with an Equal-to allowed value. The patient,
in this case, also needs to be located in the data-requestor’s pri-
mary care clinic. This fact is expressed via the relation between
the patient’s Location attribute reﬁneable and the patient’s Pri-
mary-Care-Clinic attribute reﬁneable, where the relation type is as-
signed with Equal-to.
The OPD includes few reﬁneables that are not explicitly men-
tioned in the scenario’s text. For example, the fact that the patient
is insured by an insurance company, which happens to be the
data-requestor’s employer, is expressed via a reﬁneable relation.
This fact is a known implied assumption. Thus, the OPD can be vali-
dated against the situation schema, shown in Fig. 2. As noted, the sit-
uation schema consists of situation schemaelements only,while the
situation, represented in theOPD of Fig. 5, includes also allowed val-
ues. Note that the situation complieswith the requirement that each
of its reﬁneables is assignedwith an allowed value or participates in
a reﬁneable-to-reﬁneable relation with another reﬁneable, where
the two reﬁneables share a commonancestorwithin the reﬁneables’
hierarchic structure.
5.4.2. The Medical Secretary scenario model
The Medical Secretary scenario describes the disclosure of a dis-
charge letter of a patient who was hospitalized, for the sake of
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ways: the push version and the pull version. In the push version,
the hospital department’s secretary executes the discharge-letter
transfer task, while in the pull version, the data-requestor can be
a medical staff member who works in the county medical clinic
(e.g., a secretary or a nurse) to which the patient is referred, who
is authorized to perform the transfer task. These two possible
interpretations demonstrate that the same task can be performed
by different roles in different organizations. Table 2 assumes the
push version.
In essence, the pull version and the push version are derived
from a single scenario, which does not involve a role for the
data-requestor. SitBAC can express such a role-less scenario within
its model, while RBAC cannot, as in RBAC two rules (one for pulling
and one for pushing) need to be been deﬁned, scoped with the two
corresponding roles.
The single conceptual situation is illustrated in Fig. 6. Two
important observations are noted with respect to this situation:
(1) the data-requestor entity is missing its Role reﬁneable, and
(2) the focus of this situation is on the task (transferring the dis-
charge letter) and on the legal-authorization, indicating that a for-
mal authorization is mandatory in order to perform the task. In this
case, the Referral Letter is an allowed value that is assigned
to the legal-authorization type.
Examining Fig. 6, we observe that the EHR relates to the pa-
tient, and the relation type is assigned with the Record-of al-
lowed value. The EHR has the attribute reﬁneable Ownership-of-
EHR, which indicates its ownership. The Ownership-of-EHR attri-
bute reﬁneable has a relation with the Issued-by attribute reﬁne-
able of the legal-authorization entity, where the relation type is
assigned with a Part-of allowed value. The last relation indi-
cates that the legal-authorization has to be issued by the organi-
zation who owns the EHR containing the discharge letter. The
data-requestor is reﬁned with a Retroactive Access-Time attribute
reﬁneable, which indicates the period of time during which the
data-requestor is allowed to retroactively access the patient’s
data. This attribute has to be assigned with the allowed value
3 months, and has to relate with relation type Within to
the Date-of-Issue attribute reﬁneable of the EHR Section. Finally,
the EHR Section is assigned with a Discharge Letter al-
lowed value.
If we wish to reﬁne this situation by explicitly specifying the
data-requestors that are allowed to execute this transfer task
and their reﬁneables, we can create two more situations that in-
herit from the single-version situation, presented in Fig. 6. The
inherited situations are copies of the single version, which, in
addition, include the required data-requestor. Fig. 7 illustrates
the pull version, which includes all the elements that appear
in the single version along with additional reﬁneables of the
data-requestor. The patient is reﬁned by a Patient Insurance attri-
bute reﬁneable, which relates to the data-requestor’s Employer
attribute reﬁneable. The relation type is assigned with the
Equal-to allowed value.
6. Discussion
Our work has been motivated by the need to preserve privacy in
the healthcare domain. Accordingly, our leading design principle
was that access to speciﬁc sensitive data be allowed based on cir-
cumstances that match predeﬁned patterns. This guideline has led
us to the design of the SitBAC model, consisting of a Situation Sche-
ma and a collection of Situation Instances. Our model enables
expressing access control restrictions by structurally representing
the scenarios of request for data access as situations with allowed
values assigned to them that can be validated against the situation
schema. A collection of situations can be used to formulate theorganizational policies and rules of access control permissions,
and may be dynamically changed as the organization reviews its
policies.
The SitBAC model was established after we elicited and ana-
lyzed data through qualitative research methods, which include
document (EHR) studies, questionnaires, and interviews. The
interviews, especially those conducted with interviewees who
provide paramedical or administration services, provided the
most signiﬁcant part of the data. This is so because interviewees
who provide medical services directly (mainly doctors) need fre-
quent access to all the data in the EHR in order to treat their pa-
tients, usually independently of the circumstances. Thus, creating
the situation for such cases is relatively simple. However, para-
medics or administration health workers do not usually need ac-
cess to the entire patient’s data set on a regular basis while they
provide service to the patient. When access to data is restricted,
the circumstances play an important role in the process of deci-
sion-making regarding access permission. This, in turn, results in
complex situations.
While asking our interviewees and respondents to point out
what health data they considered to be sensitive, we got many
answers reﬂecting different views concerning data sensitivity.
Nevertheless, most of the respondents indicated gynecological
data, mental health data, and data about sexually transmitted
diseases as highly sensitive categories. This rating is indeed re-
ﬂected in EHR systems, where gynecological units and mental
health units usually cannot be accessed by users outside of these
units, unlike the norm in other departments. However, there is
no direct reﬂection of the data items that we identiﬁed as sen-
sitive in the SitBAC model. This is because the model can protect
any data item that the patient prefers not to reveal by adding a
legal-authorization in a form of patient consent. Such a situation
may be deﬁned only if proper legislation exists for such patient
requirement.
We noticed that the interviewees stipulated speciﬁc actions
as they were describing their daily tasks (e.g., ordering an MRI,
transmitting a test lab by email, etc.). As a result, we got de-
tailed descriptions of the tasks carried out by the different roles
in the organization within each scenario. Admittedly, some of
the scenarios described people in the organization who were
using other people’s passwords in order to perform data access
tasks they were asked to perform in spite of the fact that the
information system in their organization was supposed to pre-
vent them from doing so. This adds value to our research, as
our model can also help the organization to represent, identify,
monitor, and enforce its internal regulations regarding tasks
involving data access on a task-related rather than a role-related
basis.
During the process of conceptualizing and modeling the Sit-
BAC using OPM, we have noticed that the process starts by ask-
ing what information needs to be disclosed to whom rather than
who has to do it. This is a fundamental difference between our
approach and that of RBAC. In RBAC, when a user requests data
access, his role is used in order to retrieve the access privileges
deﬁned for that role. In our approach, the role is only one of
the factors that are considered for obtaining a decision for a data
access request, and even not a mandatory one, as exempliﬁed in
Fig. 6.
Being a generalization or a superset of RBAC, the SitBAC model
can express RBAC rules, because each one of the RBAC elements
(Users, Roles, Objects, Operations, and Permissions) is expressed
by one of the SitBAC elements. SitBAC also enables expressing sce-
nario factors such as the patient’s age or the data-requestor’s work-
place, which need to be considered while health data is about to be
exposed. Such factors were discussed earlier by Motta and Furuie
[21], who proposed to extend the RBAC model by including contex-
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and user’s location-of-access (e.g., emergency room or clinics area).
With respect to our research, the work of Motta and Furuie has
three main limitations:
(1) Since it extends the RBAC model, the role element remains
mandatory and it serves as the mediator between the user
and the task.
(2) The Motta and Furuie extension was restricted to the
description of available cases within one hospital, while
the vision of our model is to enable expressing scenarios of
request for data access executed by one organization while
the required data is maintained by another organization.
We have modeled such a case via analyzing the complex sce-
nario in Section 5.4.2. Many of the complex scenarios that
we collected involve interoperability. This occurs in cases
where a consortium of health organizations shares patients’
data. Our model can express scenarios which involve indi-
rect access requests, which might occur if the data-requestor
has no direct relationship with the patient. For example, a
researcher who uses patient data for his research needs per-
mission from a Legal-Authorization entity. OPDs of this
example and of another example can be found at http://
www.technion.ac.il/dizza/IndirectAccessRequestsSituations.
doc.
(3) The Motta and Furuie extension was implemented via logi-
cal, cryptic-looking rules (e.g., ‘‘aPatCod in pat-
Ctx.in_patients”), where the contexts are semi-structured,
while we intend to implement our model via a formal ontol-
ogy. The situation schema elements and the allowed values
in our planned implementation will be part of the ontology,
and therefore fully structured.
Our model is reinforced by the work of Patel et al. [26],
who reported about how experts’ decision-making processes
are based on understanding a given situation and acting
upon their experience, relying on strategies of situation
recognition.
One limitation of our research is that since the qualitative part
of the research was patient-centric, it did not include all the possi-
ble stakeholders, such as employers or community service provid-
ers, with their different goals. The SitBAC model is an outcome of
analyzing the 129 scenarios that we had elicited via the qualitative
research. Since we did not interview all the possible stakeholders,
some elements may be missing from our model. However, as ex-
plained above, since SitBAC is a superset of RBAC, it is capable of
representing other scenarios, such as the indirect access scenarios
discussed above.
We are currently working on the next stage of our research,
which includes a formal representation of the SitBAC model and
its situations as a knowledge base via OWL-based ontology. An-
other aspect of our ongoing research is creating a situation-simi-
larity algorithm, which gets as input an access request in a form
of a situation instance, searches the knowledge base for a similar
situation, and based on a similarity measure, approves or declines
the access request. We plan to use a large medical center as a
case study for creating an organizational situation knowledge
base. This case study would also help us estimate the number
of situations needed for establishing organizational access control
policies. In order to represent the current access control authori-
zations in organizations that use RBAC, we will need to deﬁne at
least one default situation for each role. We will do so by speci-
fying the role of the Data Requestor entity and the sections of
the EMR. Then, we will elicit from the organization more speciﬁc
situations for which non-default access control policies would be
deﬁned.7. Conclusions
We have developed and exempliﬁed a Situation-Based Access
Control (SitBAC) model, which is designed for expressing scenar-
ios of request for patient’s data access as a basis to preservation
of the patient’s privacy. The model is generic and can be adapted
to domains other than healthcare, e.g., the banking domain. The
strengths of our model are in its ability to (1) structurally specify
scenarios of patient’s data access via situation models, (2) repre-
sent a situation where the data-requestor deﬁnition is partial
(e.g., the role is missing), and (3) represent scenarios where
the data-requestor and the required data do not belong to the
same organization. Apart from protecting patients’ privacy, Sit-
BAC could also potentially be used by organizations to assess
the adherence of its employees to regulations concerning data
access tasks.
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